G.A. Cohen and the Ethical Core of Socialism: Equality or Life-Sufficiency? by Noonan, Jeff
Socialist Studies / Études socialistes 8 (1) Winter 2012 
Copyright © 2012  The Author(s) 
 
Socialist Studies / Études socialistes: 
The Journal of the Society for Socialist Studies / Revue de la Société d'études socialistes.   
www.socialiststudies.com.  ISSN 1918‐2821 
 
 
Article 
 
 
G.A. COHEN AND THE ETHICAL CORE OF SOCIALISM:  
EQUALITY OR LIFE-SUFFICIENCY? 
 
 
JEFF NOONAN 
Department of Philosophy, University of Windsor. Windsor, Canada.1 
 
 
Abstract 
 In this paper I will critically examine G.A.’s Cohen understanding of 
equality as the normative foundation of socialism.  Cohen consistently 
maintained that inequality was the primary social problem systematically 
generated by capitalism, and that equality was the primary normative 
foundation of the socialist alternative.  The general question that I want to pose 
in this paper is: is Cohen’s understanding of equality as the normative 
foundation of socialism consistent with his general conception of socialism as a 
systemic alternative to capitalism? I will answer that it is not, because equality is 
not the best normative foundation for socialism conceived of as a systematic 
alternative to capitalism, and that elements of Cohen’s own work imply a 
deeper normative foundation in what I call the principle of life-sufficiency. 
 
Résumé 
 Cet article examine la façon dont G.A. Cohen comprenait l’égalité 
comme l’un des fondements normatifs du socialisme. Cohen a argumenté que 
l’inégalité est le premier problème social du capitalisme, et que l’égalité est le 
premier fondement normatif de l’alternative socialiste. Dans cet article, je 
m’interroge sur la cohérence entre l’idée portée par Cohen selon laquelle 
l’égalité est le fondement normatif du socialisme et sa conception générale du 
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socialisme comme une alternative systémique au capitalisme. Je répondrai à 
cette question par la négative, dans la mesure où l’égalité n’est pas le meilleur 
fondement d’un socialisme qui cherche à constituer une alternative systémique 
au capitalisme, et où certains éléments du travail de Cohen suggèrent un 
fondement plus profond  dans ce que j’appelle le principe d’« autosuffisance ». 
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 In Rescuing Justice and Equality G.A. Cohen argued that “what gets socialists 
going  politically” is the question of “why should some people be badly off, when other 
people are so well off?” (Cohen, 2008, p. 30-1).  Cohen notes that this question is not 
identical to the question of why some people are less well off than others.  In that 
comparative question there is no reference to “absolute levels of condition” (Cohen, 2008, 
31).  Thus, what motivates socialists, according to Cohen, is the problem of why so many 
people must exist at or below the absolute minimum conditions of human life.   
 
What they find wrong is that there is, so they think, unnecessary hardship, 
at the lower end of the scale.  There are people who are badly off and who, 
they believe, would be better off under an equalizing distribution.  The 
practically crucial feature of the situation is that the badly off are worse off 
than anyone needs to be, since an equalizing redistribution would enhance 
their lives (Cohen, 2008, 31).  
 
This apparently simple argument raises at least three questions that lead into the 
heart of the relationship between socialism, liberalism, and egalitarianism central to 
Cohen’s distinguished career in political philosophy.  The first is internal to any 
egalitarian philosophy, socialist or liberal:  assuming that people can be made better off by 
an equalizing distribution, what exactly ought to be equalized.  This is the question that 
initiated the ‘equality of what’ debate that began in the 1980’s with Sen’s Tanner Lectures 
and in which Cohen, along with Ronald Dworkin, and Richard Arneson, was a vigorous 
participant (Sen, 1980; Dworkin, 1981; Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1989).  The second 
distinguishes liberal from socialist egalitarians:  what are those goods which capitalism 
cannot distribute equally (thus making socialist egalitarianism necessary)?  The third 
question speaks to a normative debate internal to the history of socialism, in particular 
the broad Marxist tradition:  is the essential problem of capitalism inequality such that 
the normative basis of socialism is equality?       
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In this paper I will primarily be concerned with Cohen’s answer to question three.  
I will have occasion to discuss Cohen’s contribution to the equality of what debate, but 
only in so far as it has implications for his conclusion that equality is the normative 
foundation of socialism.  While there are many norms implicit in the socialist project, I 
believe that Cohen treats equality as fundamental, and I believe this because, as the 
quotation above illustrates, he took the struggle against inequality to be the central 
motivating problem of socialist politics.  While Cohen abandoned the revolutionary 
Marxism of his youth and early career, he never abandoned the deeper Marxist value-
commitment to a world that transcended the selfish egoism and structural inequality of 
capitalism.  He consistently maintained, from his self-critical engagement with the 
problems of orthodox Marxism in Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality to Rescuing 
Justice and Equality that inequality was the primary social problem systematically 
generated by capitalism, and that equality was the primary normative foundation of the 
socialist alternative, however the achievement of that alternative be envisioned.  The 
general question that I want to pose in this paper is:  is Cohen’s understanding of equality 
as the normative foundation of socialism consistent with his general conception of 
socialism as a systemic alternative to capitalism?   
I will answer that it is not, because equality is not the best normative foundation 
for socialism conceived of as a systematic alternative to capitalism, and that elements of 
Cohen’s own work imply a deeper normative foundation.  This alternative normative 
foundation I will call the principle of life-sufficiency.  It is the deeper, and thus better, 
normative foundation in the sense that if it were realized it would solve the sorts of 
problems that a more equal society would solve, in addition to problems that equality, 
even of a substantive, socialist sort, would not solve.  I will argue that this principle is 
distinct from principles of distributive equality because principles of distributive equality 
abstract from differences between people and ignore potential environmental impacts of 
equalizing consumption at ever higher material levels.  As I will demonstrate, the 
principle of life-sufficiency is implicit but undeveloped in the works of Marx and Engels 
and also, crucially, Cohen.   I will unpack my argument in three steps.  In the first, I will 
explicate what I take to be Marx’s and Engels’ critique of equality as the normative 
foundation of socialism and set out their alternative grounding.  In the second I will turn 
to the work of Cohen, spelling out his understanding of equality as the normative 
foundation of socialism, his reasons for this conclusion, the content of his socialist 
equality principle, but also what I take to be his alternative grounding.  In the concluding 
section I will demonstrate more precisely how these alternative groundings imply the 
principle of life-sufficiency and explicate its general social implications.  
 
I:  Marx and the Critique of Equality 
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While Cohen believed that historical and social changes warranted the 
repudiation of orthodox, revolutionary Marxism, he remained committed to socialism as 
a systematic alternative to capitalism. “Any attempt to realize the socialist ideal runs up 
against entrenched capitalist power and human selfishness.  Politically serious people 
must take those obstacles seriously.  But they are not reasons to disparage the ideal itself” 
(Cohen, 2009, 80).   I  will examine what Cohen takes this ideal to be, and the essential 
role that equality plays in it, in the next section.  I begin with this point in order to explain 
the reason why I take Marx’s and Engels’ critique of equality to be relevant to the 
evaluation of Cohen’s socialist egalitarianism.  Cohen does not repudiate that which he 
takes to be the deepest values of socialism and he never repudiates Marx’s and Engels’ 
signal contribution to the explication of those values.  Hence, that which Marx and Engels 
had to say about the relationship between capitalism, socialism, and equality is relevant to 
the assessment of Cohen’s attempt to establish equality as the foundational value of the 
socialism.   
On first examination it appears that there is almost no evidence to support the 
belief that Marx or Engels believed that equality was a central value, much less the 
foundational value, of socialist society.  Every place one looks— in Marx’s early 
philosophical works, in his political pamphlets, in his systematic political economy, in 
Engels’ elaborations of historical materialism—one finds equality either criticised and 
dismissed or reduced to a distinct political goal.   
One of Marx’s first systematic examinations of the relationship between equality 
and the future alternative society he defended occurs in the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844.  Marx is abundantly clear that what he means by communism is not 
equality of wealth or resources or anything else one might care to equalize.   
 
The thought of every piece of private property as such is at least turned 
against wealthier private property in the form of envy and the urge to 
reduce things to a common level, so that this envy and urge even 
constitute the essence of competition.  Crude communism is only the 
culmination of this envy and of this levelling-down (Marx, 1975, 295).   
 
Let us note two claims whose importance is crucial to the argument of the rest of 
the paper.  First, Marx acknowledges that there is some political value to the demand for 
equality, in so far as it generates opposition to accumulated wealth.  Second, this political 
value is only negative, i..e, it states what communism is against but not what it is for.  As 
we will see, while communism may be against definite forms of inequality, it would be 
wrong to conclude that the value it is primarily for is equality.  
  Indeed, even inequality as a negative value motivating opposition to capitalism is 
ultimately an inadequate motivation, because the ability to recognise inequality does not 
entail understanding of its systematic causes.  For Marx and Engels moral outrage had to 
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be combined with understanding of the social causes of the mass poverty that were the 
object of that outrage. The real cause of inequality, for Marx and Engels, is the class 
structure of capitalist society.  The critique of capitalism thus must ultimately be directed 
against its class structure, not inequality of wealth or resources.   As they argue in the 
Communist Manifesto, “the immediate aim of the Communists is ... [the] formation of the 
proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political 
power by the proletariat” (Marx and Engels, 1986, 48).  As Engels later elaborated, if 
“equality”  has any meaning as a goal of socialist struggle, it is only in the sense that it is 
synonymous with the overthrow of class rule.  In his polemic with Durhing Engels 
examines the differing meanings of equality in bourgeois and in proletarian politics. 
After admitting that the demand for equality has been a historic demand of both 
feudal peasant and modern workers, Engels concludes that “the real content of the 
proletarian demand for equality is the abolition of classes” (Engels, 1959, 147-148).  But 
abolition of classes is not essentially an alternation in the distribution of resources under 
capitalism, but the end of capitalist social relations and values altogether.  Struggles over 
the distribution of wealth and resources are already central to capitalist society; the 
struggle for socialism is thus not a struggle for a different distribution of wealth and 
resources, but a struggle for a different society.  The meaning of this distinction can be 
clarified by turning to a brief examination of Marx’s further arguments against equality in 
Capital and Critique of the Gotha Programme.  
 It is true that Marx and Engels were willing to employ the idea of equality as a 
slogan and mobilising tool, but their goal was never to make it the bedrock distributive 
principle of socialism. They do not make it the bedrock principle of socialism because 
they tend to regard formal equality as the bedrock principle of capitalist society which 
creates the legal-political space the proletariat requires to develop its more radically 
transformative agenda.   
The best example of this line of argument is found in Capital, Volume One, where 
Marx discusses the struggle between capitalists and workers over the duration of the 
working day:  
 
There is here, therefore, an antinomy, right against right, both equally 
bearing the seal of the law of exchanges.  Between equal right, force 
decides.  Hence it is that in the history of capitalist production, the 
determination of what is a working day, presents itself as the result of a 
struggle ... between the class of capitalists ... and the working class (Marx, 
1986, 225).  
 
Equality of rights is not unimportant because, as I noted above, it creates a legal 
and political space for working class mobilisation.  While the immediate goals of these 
mobilisations might be thought of in terms of creating a more equal material distribution 
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(of work time, or whatever other resource might be the particular issue of contention) 
successful struggles for more equal distributions of resources will not collectively add up 
to a socialist society.  For that to happen, as Marx and Engels made clear, the class 
structure of capitalism must be abolished.   
 The structural problem that necessitates the radical transformation of capitalist 
class structure is not inequality of wealth or resources but rather exclusive class control of 
the natural and social conditions of life-maintenance and development.  It is this 
structural dependence of human life on capitalist markets that makes the working class 
dependent and unfree in its life-activity under capitalism.  The deepest value underlying 
socialist society is thus, as Engels put it, “the organization of society in such a way that 
every member of it can develop and use all of his capabilities and powers in complete 
freedom and without thereby infringing the basic conditions of this society” (Quoted in 
Lebowitz, 2006, 13).   
This thought, drawn from an early draft of the Communist Manifesto, is more 
fully developed in Marx’s most extended critique of the principle of equality in The 
Critique of the Gotha Programme.  Here Marx’s target is the equilsand proposed by the 
German Social Democratic Party: equality of labour.  Equality of labour meant that all 
labour would be paid at the same rate and only differences due to different quantities of 
labour supplied would be permitted.  Again, Marx accepts, as a matter of historical 
necessity, that such transitional metrics of socialist distribution might be required, but he 
is careful to emphasise that to the extent that such abstract metrics must be applied to the 
distribution of social resources, it is because society is still to that extent rooted in the 
older capitalist system.  “Hence equal right here is still in principle—bourgeois right” 
(Marx, 1978,  530).  Remember that this claim is made in the context of a critique of the 
idea that equality of labour ought to be the principle of socialist distribution.  When we 
keep this context in mind it is clear that the target of Marx’s critique is not, as it might 
appear, the idea of “bourgeois right” in the abstract, but equal rights as the normative 
foundation of a socialist system of distribution.  He believes that this transitional form is 
an advance over capitalism in so far as it would attenuate the structural class privileges of 
capitalism, but he remains critical of the idea of equality, whether construed formally, in 
relation to rights, or substantively, as the normative foundation of socialist distribution.   
“Equality” of whatever sort is a problematic normative foundation for socialism because it 
is an abstraction which masks what is really essential to human life, which is neither the 
formal rights humans might share in common with others nor how much of something 
people have in comparison with other people, but what they require as concrete 
individuals to ‘develop their capabilities and powers in complete freedom.’  
 Marx rejects any metric of equality as the normative foundation of a socialist 
society because all metrics only function by abstracting from the differences that make 
people real as individuals.  Different individuals, he claims, “are measurable only by an 
equal standard ... in so far as they are taken from one definite side only” (Marx, 1978, 
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530). The truly radical difference between socialism and capitalism is that socialism will 
secure to each person the natural and social conditions of freely individuating themselves 
across all dimensions of human experience and activity.  Engels makes this point very 
clearly:  “The development of industry will provide society with a quantity of products 
sufficient to satisfy the needs of all (emphasis added)” (Engels, 1973, 92-93). Achieving 
this goal requires a principle of distribution governed by the goal of satisfying human 
needs, not for the sake of ensuring consistency with any abstract metric of equality 
between people, but  rather ensuring sufficiency for each to accomplish their projects.  
The argument is summed up in Marx’s  aphorism defining the distributive principle of 
the fully developed socialist society (communism): “From each according to his abilities, 
to each according to his needs” (Marx, 1978,  531).  There is thus abundant textual 
evidence to support the claim that Marx and Engels were willing to employ the idea of 
substantive equality as a mobilizing tool, but also that they consistently regarded the value 
of equality as more bourgeois than socialist, and not therefore the  fundamental value 
upon which the justification and organization of socialist society would rest.  
 This textual evidence notwithstanding, the claim that Marx’s and Engels’ 
conception of socialism is not fundamentally egalitarian has proven controversial.  Alan 
Wood, for example, reads the textual evidence as I do, concluding that Marx “regards 
‘equality’ as a confusing and outmoded way of representing the goal of abolishing class 
distinctions ... [and he favours abolishing class distinctions] because he thinks it will lead 
to other things he values, such as increased human freedom, well-being, community, and 
individual development or self-actualisation” (Wood, 1981, 212).  Yet this reading is 
rejected by critics like Kai Nielsen, who see no opposition between these goals listed by 
Wood and constantly asserted by Marx and a certain form of egalitarianism.  For Nielsen, 
the deepest form of egalitarianism affirmed by Marx is what one might call moral 
egalitarianism and Nielsen calls fairness: “the demand that ...social structures be put in 
place designed to enhance the lives of everyone where it is taken to as a fundamental 
guiding principle that the life of each person count and count equally”(Nielsen, 1988,  
294).  In order to realize this principle, Nielsen goes on to argue, more equal distributions 
of wealth and resources than are possible under capitalism are necessary: “someone ... 
who thinks classlessness is important will think social equality is important.  Unless we 
want to attribute a very extensive confusion to Marx and Engels, we cannot say that they 
valued classlessness and did not value equality as a goal” (Nielsen, 1988, 318).   
Cohen, as I will now go on to argue, agrees with the general conclusion arrived at 
by Nielsen, regarding Marx’s critique of capitalism and the distributional  principle of 
fully developed socialist society as egalitarianism.  Yet, as the debate between Wood and 
Nielsen makes clear, there is much normative ambiguity in Marx, ambiguity which is 
bifurcated between Wood and Nielsen in their debate, but is internal to Cohen’s 
contribution, or so I will argue.  In the next section I will examine Cohen’s understanding 
of the role of egalitarianism in a socialist society, but also bring out the ambiguity.  In the 
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final section I will attempt to resolve that ambiguity by arguing for the superiority of the 
life-sufficiency principle of distribution implied in Marx, Engels, and I will show, Cohen 
as well.   
 
II:  Cohen:  Egalitarianism and Socialism 
 
Cohen knows the core texts of Marxism as well as anyone and so he is aware of 
the arguments that Marx levelled against egalitarianism.  Nevertheless, Cohen persists in 
reading even the principle of fully developed socialism (communism)  as an egalitarian 
principle.  “The achievement of Marxist equality (from each according to his abilities, to 
each according to his needs) is premised on a conviction that industrial progress brings 
society to a condition of such fluent abundance that it is possible to supply what everyone 
needs for a richly fulfilling life”  (Cohen, 1995, 10)  Why does Cohen regard this as an 
egalitarian principle, when, at least on the surface, Marx and Engels did not.  Cohen 
regards it as an egalitarian principle because, viewed from the standpoint not of what 
each consumes and utilises (which will differ)  but what each is able to achieve, the 
principle valorises equal outcomes for all.  In other words, the equality at work in Marx’s 
aphorism is general equality of condition leading to general equality of outcome and 
achievement:  each is furnished with the resources each requires for the equally free 
development of their capacities.  All are thus equally free to contribute to the social whole 
in the way each sees fit:   
 
An overflowing abundance renders it unnecessary to press the talent of the 
naturally better endowed into the service of the poorly endowed for the 
sake of establishing equality of condition and it is therefore unnecessary to 
trench against or modify self-ownership, in order to achieve that equality. 
(Cohen, 1995, 122)   
 
  Cohen’s subsequent development of his own conception of equality results from 
his claims that the historical, social, and political conditions have changed so drastically 
that no one can any longer plausibly believe that a society that satisfies the conditions laid 
down in Marx’s aphorism is possible.  Cohen’s more nuanced views on the role of 
equality in socialism emerge out of his re-assessment of political possibility.  I will 
explicate that reassessment and then move on to unpack more carefully Cohen’s later 
views on equality in general and socialist equality in particular.  
Cohen, as I noted, reads Marx’s aphorism as an egalitarian principle which is no 
longer of live practical value, because the assumptions upon which it rests, both 
technological and political, have been falsified.  He argues that the predictions that Marx 
made about universal working class solidarity have been shown false and that his 
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assumptions about the power of technology to overcome natural scarcity have been 
refuted by the growing intensity of environmental crisis:  
 
We cannot share Marx’s optimism about material possibility, but we 
therefore also cannot share his pessimism about social possibility, if we 
wish to retain a socialist commitment.  We cannot rely on technology to 
fix things for us:  if they can be fixed, we have to fix them, through hard 
theoretical and political labour. (Cohen, 1995, 11)  
 
In Cohen’s view, Marx’s social pessimism lay in his assumption that only absolute 
abundance could overcome the tendencies towards selfishness and conflict.  Since the 
twentieth century has awoken to the ecological limits to absolute material abundance, this 
assumption of Marx’s must be dropped.   
Once socialists drop the utopian hope for absolute equality of freedom to pursue 
life-projects, they must confront a set of hard political and philosophical problems that 
the absolute abundance assumption allowed them to avoid.  “We have to seek equality for 
a context of scarcity, and we consequently have to be far more clear ... about what we are 
seeking, and how it can be implemented, institutionally” Cohen, 1995, 10-11).  These 
arguments are found in the egalitarian liberal tradition, with which socialists must now 
come to terms, and from which they must learn.  “An attempt to pursue a consistent 
egalitarianism in political philosophy will be found within the literature of contemporary 
liberalism, which Marxists must, accordingly, address”(Cohen, 1995, 160).  It was as a 
result of this conclusion that he began to take the “equality of what” debate seriously, as a 
potential source for a realistic principle of socialist organization.   
Cohen’s first major contribution to this debate was the paper “On the Currency of 
Egalitarian Justice.” Cohen develops his position through critical engagement with the 
arguments of Rawls, Sen, Dworkin, and Arneson.  My interests here are confined to 
Cohen’s own answer and its relevance to the general problem at issue:  is equality the 
normative foundation of socialism?  In general, Cohen concludes, a just society must 
ensure what he calls “equal access to advantage.”  The key contribution to the debate, as 
Cohen sees it, made by his argument is to make clear the importance of the distinction 
“between choice and luck in shaping peoples fates” (Cohen, 1989, 907).  Where 
inequalities arise from real choices that people make and can be held accountable for, 
there is no moral problem.  Where inequalities result from bad luck—for example, the 
class into which one has been born—there is a social responsibility to correct for these 
disadvantages.   “The right reading of egalitarianism,” Cohen argues, is the one whose 
“purpose is to eliminate involuntary disadvantage, by which I (stipulatively) mean 
disadvantage for which the sufferer cannot be held responsible, since it does not 
appropriately reflect choices that he has made or is making or would make.”(Cohen, 
1989,  916).   Cohen regards equal access to advantage as a more demanding form of 
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equality than equality of primary goods (Rawls), capabilities (Sen), resources (Dworkin), 
or welfare (Arneson).  
 Cohen’s entry into the ‘equality of what debate’ enabled him to pose and answer 
questions more or less foreign to the Marxist tradition:  what role do tastes play in the 
production of inequalities, do inequalities that result from expensive tastes involve 
questions of justice, what is the difference between luck and choice, and, most generally 
and most importantly, what are the social conditions of responsibility for one’s choices?  
Cohen does not directly consider the more particular question of what the significance of 
these arguments are for the understanding of the problem of the normative foundations 
of socialism (which remains in the background here even though that is the problem that 
motivated his turn towards the liberal debate).  Nevertheless, its significance for 
addressing that problem is clear:  if it is the case that socialists can no longer reasonably 
expect technological developments to simultaneously produce universal revolutionary 
consciousness and the material conditions that ensure a successful revolution, then they 
need a new idea of equality as their guiding norm.  The idea of equality which is both 
appropriate to conditions of scarcity and best preserves the socialist project to which 
Cohen always remained committed is his conception of equal access to advantage, as the 
most thoroughgoing material equality of any of the alternatives on offer in the equality of 
what debate.   
 The connection between Cohen’s intervention in the liberal equality of what 
debate and his abiding socialist commitments is made more clear in his systematic 
critique of Rawls in Rescuing Justice and Equality.  The relevance of his argument for 
present purposes concerns the way in which Cohen exposes and calls into question the 
justice of the idea—which Rawls shares with neo-classical economics—that inequality is 
essential as motivation for those with capital to invest it in ways that better satisfy the 
interests of the worst off than available alternatives.   “The persuasive power of this 
defence of inequality,” Cohen contends, “has helped to drive authentic egalitarianism, of 
an old-fashioned, uncompromising kind, out of contemporary political philosophy.  The 
present essay is part of an attempt to bring it back in” (Cohen, 2008, 87). Cohen thus 
remains a critic of the capitalist assumptions underlying Rawls argument without having 
to fall back on the utopian assumptions of classical Marxism whose intrinsic problems led 
him into the equality of what debate in the first place. 
However, Cohen’s defence of “old-fashioned” egalitarianism in Rescuing Justice 
and Equality does not include a systematic explication of what a contemporary socialist 
alternative would require.  Rather, its significance for a socialist alternative is primarily 
negative, in that it exposes the way in which traditional capitalist incentive structures are 
assumed by Rawls, even though he claims to be neutral with regard to the choice between 
capitalism and socialism (Cohen, 2008, p. 163). In order to understand the positive 
significance that equality has for socialism we must turn to a short text which turned out 
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to be Cohen’s final contribution to the problem of the normative foundation of socialism: 
Why Not Socialism? 
In Why Not Socialism? Cohen defends the desirability of socialism by employing 
an extended metaphor, a camping trip taken by a group of friends, in which each 
contributes in their own way to the satisfaction of the needs of the others and in turn is 
enabled to pursue those pursuits that most interest them.  Some cook, some clean, some 
fish, some hike.  In other words, in return for a contribution to the satisfaction of others 
needs, each is able to pursue their own goals—from each according to their abilities, to 
each according to their needs.  The camping trip exemplifies, according to Cohen, “the 
socialist way, with collective property and planned mutual giving.”(Cohen, 2009, 10)  He 
then further explicates the “socialist way” by articulating the two normative principles 
upon which it rests:  a socialist equality principle and a principle of community.   
The socialist equality principle is distinguished from both classical liberal equality 
and left-liberal equality in so far as it corrects for disadvantages “that arise out of native 
differences as a further source of injustice, beyond that imposed by unchosen social 
backgrounds” Cohen, 2009, 17).  Moreover, socialist equality of opportunity depends 
upon addressing the underlying structural causes of inequality of opportunity under 
capitalism:  “Importantly, the removal of blocks to the opportunity of some people does 
not always leave the opportunities of the initially better placed intact ... I underline this 
point because it means that promoting equality of opportunity is not only an equalizing, 
but also a redistributing policy” (Cohen, 2009, 14)  This last point makes Cohen’s general 
egalitarian theory of equality of access to advantage politically concrete.  One might thus 
think of the socialist principle of equality of opportunity as a species of the genus equality 
of access to advantage.  It is what results when the general egalitarian principle is applied 
under conditions of class inequality, as the justification for the changes to the distribution 
of resources that capitalist class structure causes.   
I agree—as any socialist would—that capitalism is marked by structural 
inequalities in “access to advantage.”  These structural inequalities appear as radically 
unequal opportunities for life-experience and enjoyment of the people who inhabit 
opposite ends of the income scale.  Socialism of any sort must therefore be concerned 
with and propose realizable means of addressing these inequalities.  At the same time, I 
do not believe that even this exigent form of equality is the normative foundation of 
socialism, and I believe that Cohen’s second principle, the principle of community, points 
us in the direction of why it is not.        
Like any principle of equality, the socialist principle of equality of opportunity 
depends upon interpersonal comparisons in its determination of what is an acceptable 
and what is an unacceptable form of inequality:   
 
Preferences across income and leisure are not in principle different from 
preferences across apples and oranges, and there can be no objection to 
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differences in people’s benefits and burdens that reflect nothing but 
different preferences, when, (which is not always) their satisfaction leads to 
a comparable aggregate enjoyment of life (Cohen, 2009, 19).   
 
The problem, from a socialist point of view, is that as a principle of equality, socialist 
equality of opportunity abstracts from the content of what counts as “enjoyment of life”  
for each and for all, and instead focuses on the problem of interpersonal comparisons 
relative to an abstract metric of equality.  This comparison of concrete individuals 
according to an abstract standard is exactly that which caused Marx to reject equality as 
the normative foundation of socialism, because he always maintained, from his earliest 
philosophical work to his death, that socialism depended upon the ability of people to 
transcend the bourgeois perspective of invidious interpersonal comparison that any 
abstract metric of equality presupposes.    
In Cohen’s work this Marxist argument re-appears, although he does not see it as 
in tension with the socialist principle of equality.  Nevertheless, if we think carefully about 
what his principle of community must presuppose about people and their relationships, a 
definite tension becomes evident.   The principle of community maintains that “people 
care about, and, where necessary, care for, one another, and, too, care that they care about 
one another” Cohen, 2009, 34-35).  Principles of equality—even the principle of socialist 
equality of opportunity--  do not presuppose that people care that they care about one 
another, only that they have the same amount of something as everyone else according to 
whichever metric of equality is being employed.  Assuming equality, they could, without 
violating the spirit or the letter of the principle, care nothing further about each other. 
But such indifference would contradict the principle of community, and make socialism 
as a systematic alternative to capitalism impossible.   
Cohen explicitly links acceptance of the principle of community to a rejection of 
the forms of social relationship that define capitalist market society.  The principle of 
community “is the anti-market principle according to which I serve you not because of 
what I can get in return by doing so, but because you need ... my service, and you, for the 
same reason, serve me” Cohen, 2009,  39).  In other words, the principle of community 
starts from the assumption that human beings are interdependent and cannot flourish as 
individuals save through cooperation and sharing of resources for the sake of ensuring 
our natural and social life-requirements are met.  This assumption is distinct from the 
assumption of socialist equality, because, again, equality is a comparative term.  It does 
not specify that which human beings require as natural and social beings in order to 
develop their capacities freely, nor does it establish any criteria or limits to the content of 
the capacities developed.  But the principle of community, as his explication above 
implies, does:  my capacities are to be realized in ways that satisfy others’ needs in a 
virtuous circle of mutual self-development.   
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The virtuous circle of need-satisfaction and capacity realization contrasts 
systematically with the principles of capitalist society.   
 
Within market society ... the choices of others massively confine each 
individual’s pursuit of her own choices, but that fact is masked in market 
society, because, unlike what is true on the camping trip, in market society 
the unavoidable mutual dependence of human beings is not brought into 
consciousness, as a datum for formal and informal planning (Cohen, 2009,  
48).   
 
It is essential to note that the object of formal and informal planning is not who gets how 
much of what in comparison with others, but with whether what each does contributes to 
the satisfaction of the needs of all the others.  In other words, the raison d’etre of planning 
is to ensure that everyone’s life-horizons are as wide as possible, by ensuring that the 
social forces generated by ‘private’ market decisions are constrained, not, in the first 
instance, by considerations of equality, but by considerations of shared need, of 
community, of care for the well-being of each and all.  
 
III:  Socialism, Life-Coherence, and Life-Sufficiency 
 
Thus, the key tension in Cohen’s work is between a principle of equality that relies 
on interpersonal comparisons and abstracts from the content of what people actually 
require and do, and a principle of equality which looks beyond interpersonal contrast to 
new relations of recognized interdependence and mutual need.  What Cohen does not tell 
us is what in fact our fundamental needs are.  In this silence he follows Marx, who, 
despite invoking the concept of need throughout his career never anywhere rigorously 
distinguishes it from the consumer demands his critique of capitalism ought to have led 
him to distinguish them from.  In fact, in crucial places Marx out and out conflates needs 
with consumer demands, as when he argues, in “Wages, Price, and Profit,”  that a person 
remains content with a modest house that satisfies her need for shelter until her 
neighbour builds a “palace.”  The person in the modest dwelling then feels compelled to 
“need”  a bigger house (Marx, 1973, 163; Noonan, 2006, 123).  What the person feels, 
however, is not a fundamental need, if we define needs as objective and universal life-
requirements, and objective and universal life-requirements as those resources, practices, 
relationships, and institutions which, if we are deprived of them, cause demonstrable 
harm to our lives and life-capacities (McMurtry, 1998, 164).  The link between needs and 
capacities established in Marx’s principle of fully developed socialism implies such a 
universal and objective definition of needs as life-requirements, but it is nowhere spelled 
out. 
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Cohen also does not spell out any rigorous distinction between needs as life-
requirements and consumer desires—between the resources etc., that human beings 
require to live and freely flourish and the things etc., that capitalist consumer markets 
require us to purchase if it is to accumulate capital.  Yet, the definition proposed here is 
not completely foreign to Cohen’s work, but implied in his prescient ecological 
arguments against the implications for the natural worlds of the unlimited abundance 
Marx imagined fully developed socialism to entail:   
 
the development of the productive forces runs up against a resource 
barrier.  Technical knowledge has not stopped, and will not stop growing, 
but productive power, which is the capacity (all things considered) to 
transform nature into use-value, cannot expand pari passu with the growth 
of technical knowledge, because the planet earth rebels: its resources turn 
out not to be lavish enough for continuous growth” (Cohen, 1995, 7).   
 
Thus socialism requires not unlimited abundance, but economic development governed 
by the principle of life-coherence, and not equal levels of consumption at ever higher 
levels, but consumption limited by the principle of life-sufficiency.    
The principle of life-coherence is implied by Cohen’s ecological critique of the 
utopian demand for unlimited growth.  Against the demand for unlimited growth the 
principle of life-coherence claims that only such patterns of economic development and 
social appropriation of resources is materially rational that “consistently enables 
ecological and human life together” (McMurtry, 2011, 14).  This contrasts both with the 
capitalist system-requirement for endless economic growth, which Cohen, as a socialist, 
opposes, and Marx’s blind faith in the powers of productive force development, which 
Cohen, as a self-critical socialist, also opposes.  The principled basis of that opposition is 
not fully explicated in Cohen’s work.  Nevertheless, the life-coherence principle clearly 
satisfies that which is implied but unstated:  the idea that economic growth must be life-
serving in order to be good, and it can only be human life-serving if it is does not destroy 
the natural basis of all life on earth.   Social institutions and individual choices are thus 
life-coherent when they preserve and improve the life-enabling and life-developing 
powers of natural and social fields of life and life- incoherent when they degrade the 
former or employ the later to serve the particular interests of a definite social group 
against the shared life-interests of all, including the privileged group.   
The principle of life-coherence exposes another hidden danger of making equality 
the normative principle of socialism.  Equality can be achieved by raising up or lowering 
down, but in either case the term ‘equality’ itself can tell us nothing about whether 
production and distribution is either life-coherent or life-incoherent.  That is, there is no 
contradiction, from the standpoint of any principle of equality, in socio-economic 
systems which strive for social equality at such a level of material abundance that 
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impossible strains are placed on the natural environment.  In order to see this problem 
the goal of equality must itself be grounded in the principle of life-coherence, for only if 
we view human society in the context of the global field of life-support do the limits to 
material abundance become clear.  Once we begin to think of consumption not in 
capitalist terms, as an instrumental requirement of endless money-value growth, but in 
terms of what is actually required for a happy and fulfilling life, the problems of equality 
and inequality take on a different appearance, nicely captured by David Schweickart’s 
question:  “Would we be concerned about inequality if everyone in our society had 
enough?” (Schweikhart, 2011, 94).  My response is that no, we would not be (or, we 
would not any longer be ethically obligated to be concerned about it).  Thus, if we rethink 
the goal of equality in a life-coherent way, we are led, I suggest, to a reformulation of the 
fundamental goal of socialism:  not equality of opportunity in the abstract, but life-
sufficient provision of that which is universally required in order for each to live as a 
happy, engaged, fully contributing social self-conscious agent to the communal whole.  
This claim raises the obvious question of what exactly is required if that goal is to be 
realized for each and all.   
I have defended a tripartite set of fundamental human life-requirements in other 
works over the past five years (Noonan, 2008, 118-37; Noonan, 2008a, 31-55, Noonan, 
2009, 377-393, Noonan, 2011, 117-134, Noonan, 2012, forthcoming.).  These sets of life-
requirements comprise the physical-organic requirements of biological life (including 
food, water, shelter, clothing, and health care), the socio-cultural requirements of human 
life as a social self-conscious agent, (including familial love and care, education, access to 
natural beauty and artistic creation, a sustainable economy which produces life-valuable 
goods and enables all which require meaningful and non-alienated work to find it, and 
democratic participation across major social institutions)  and the temporal requirements 
of free human activity, (comprised of an experience of time as an open matrix of 
possibilities for action and requiring for its realization the release of as much life-time as 
possible from the demands of coercive external routines).  The satisfaction of these life-
requirements is not intrinsically but instrumentally valuable as the natural and social 
conditions for the free development of those sentient, cognitive, imaginative, and creative 
capacities that distinguish human life and make it good and worth living.  These life-
requirements are to be distinguished from both consumer demands (whose satisfaction 
has no life-value) and instrumental conditions for the successful realization of any project 
whatsoever.  While the instrumental conditions for the successful realization of any 
projects are needs relative to that project, only those projects which have instrumental or 
intrinsic life-value deserve social support.  Projects that are manifestly life-destructive 
have no legitimate claim on natural or social wealth.  The principle of life-sufficiency does 
not mandate that everyone receive an equal share of each life-requirement satisfiers or 
equal resources to pursue their life-valuable projects, but sufficient life-requirement 
satisfiers to ensure their life and free agency, subject to the principle of life-coherence as 
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stated above.  It is life-sufficient provision that can ensure the full developing everyone’s 
social self-conscious agency in ways that contribute, as Cohen’s principle of community 
demands, to the satisfaction of others’ life-requirements and thus the development of 
their social self-conscious agency. 
The principle of life-sufficient production and distribution thus implies intrinsic 
limits on the demands people make on natural and social resources.  That does not mean 
that it mandates an ascetic life-style or subordinates individual happiness to reified 
conditions of environmental health.  “Sufficiency” means sufficiency not just for mere 
biological life but human life, life as a socially self-conscious creative agent who is able 
and who enjoys contributing to the preservation of the natural system of life-support and 
the socio-cultural system of life-development.  It re-grounds happiness from the illusory 
and all-too-ephemeral pleasures of the shopping mall to the activity of living as a unique, 
individual, creative member of complex communities.   This form of life is, I believe, 
exactly the form of life that is demanded by Cohen’s principle of community.  Both 
envisage socialist society as a virtuous circle in which individuals’ find meaning in their 
life as creative agents realizing their capacities in ways which serve the life-requirements 
of their fellow citizens, and are served in turn by them.  There are innumerable particular 
ways in which this vocation can be lived:  growing the food we need, building and fixing 
things our lives require, teaching, healing, caring for, cleaning, cooking, and reflecting 
upon and improving the existing ways of accomplishing these essential tasks.  This 
virtuous circle is made the principle of social reality to the extent that social wealth is 
liberated from its form as private money-capital to become collectively controlled 
resources used to fund the institutions and practices that our lives as socially self-
conscious agents require.  Productivity gains, instead of being realized as higher profits 
and higher unemployment, are realized as more socially available time for free 
exploration and activity.     
The principle of life-sufficiency is normatively more basic than even socialist 
equality of opportunity, since equality, socialist or otherwise,  implies no intrinsic limits 
on that which people may demand, because equality is relative to an abstract metric, and 
it makes no demands on others or oneself, beyond holding oneself to levels of demand 
that do not exceed the abstract metric.  “Life-sufficiency,” by contrast, is objectively 
determinable by that which is required for life as a socially self-conscious contributing 
agent—water, not pop, attractive, well-made, and climate appropriate clothing for all, not 
haute couture for the few , love, care and friendship, not domination, instrumentalization, 
and violence, education and creativity, not the vapid distractions of capitalist consumer 
culture, and the experience of time as an open matrix of possibilities for action, not the 
external burdens of imposed routines devoid of intrinsically interesting activity.  The 
contributions that each life makes to the creation of such a world are thus both 
intrinsically valuable, as the enjoyed expression of one’s own capacities and talents, and 
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instrumentally valuable, as real contributions to the conditions of other people’s good 
lives.   
 If we think the principle life-coherence and the principle of life-sufficiency 
together we arrive at what I regard as the deepest normative foundation for socialism.  
This foundation can be expressed in a revised version of Marx’s famous aphorism:  “from 
each according to his or her capacities to make life-valuable contributions to nature, 
society and others’ individual lives, to each according to his or her real life-requirements 
for the sake of his or her own self-development.”  This fundamental principle is implied 
by Cohen’s principle of community, because it is a principle that demands that individual 
action proceed from knowledge of mutual interdependence, not as a negative limit on 
what one can do as an individual, but as a positive enabling condition and the raison 
d’etre of good action.     
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